Philosophy Faculty Works

Philosophy

Spring 2010

Philosophy and Theology: Notes on Human Dignity
Christopher Kaczor
Loyola Marymount University, Christopher.Kaczor@lmu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher Kaczor, “Philosophy and Theology” Notes on Human Dignity, National Catholic Bioethics
Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 175-181.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

Philosophy and Theology
The im portance o f hum an dignity has been highlighted in the public eye both
by the book com m issioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics titled H um an
D ignity a n d Bioethics and also by the Vatican declaration D ignitas personae} A
num ber o f recent works have also critiqued hum an dignity in a variety o f ways, and
this reflection responds to a few o f these negative appraisals.12 In his article “The
Stupidity o f Dignity,” Steven Pinker argues against the usefulness o f dignity as a
central principle in bioethics.3
In addition to the am biguity o f the term “dignity,” Pinker sees three problem s
w ith m aking use o f dignity as a central principle o f bioethics, namely, that dignity
is relative, fungible, and can be harm ful. We should therefore reject m aking use o f
“hum an dignity” in argum ents about bioethics and rely solely on “autonomy.” To
illustrate the problem atic nature o f appeals to dignity, Pinker w rites,
First, dignity is relative. One doesn’t have to be a scientific or moral relativist
to notice that ascriptions of dignity vary radically with the time, place, and
beholder. In olden days, a glimpse of stocking was looked on as something

1Adam Schulman, Edmund Pellegrino, and Thomas W. Merrill, eds., Human Dignity
and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (Wash
ington, D.C.: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2008); and Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas personae on Certain Bioethical Questions
(September 8, 2008).
2These negative evaluations of human dignity can have profound effect on the legal
culture. For a helpful appraisal of an earlier and influential critique of human dignity, see
John Keown and David Jones, “ Surveying the Foundations of Medical Law: A Reassessment
of Glanville Williams’s The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal Law,” Medical Law Review
16.1 (Spring 2008): 85-126.
3Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics’ Latest, Most
Dangerous Ploy,” New Republic, May 28, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/article/the -stupidity
-dignity.
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shocking. We chuckle at the photographs of Victorians in starched collars
and wool suits hiking in the woods on a sweltering day, or at the Brahmins
and patriarchs of countless societies who consider it beneath their dignity to
pick up a dish or play with a child.4
A problem Pinker faces is that autonomy is also relative. The im portance o f autonomy
in contem porary discourse can be traced historically to the philosophy of Im m anuel
Kant, w ho considered it always contrary to autonomy, the self-given law o f practical
reason, to com m it suicide for any reason whatsoever, to lie about any m atter with
any intention in any circum stance, or to have sexual intercourse outside o f m arriage.
M any contem porary philosophers enlist autonom y as a justification for conclusions
th at are contradictory to the ones draw n by Kant. I f dignity cannot work as a central
principle in bioethics because it is relative historically, autonom y cannot work as a
central principle in bioethics for the same reason.
P in k e r offers an o th er rationale for dropping d ig n ity from the bioethics
vocabulary:
Second, dignity is fungible. The [President’s] Council and [the] Vatican treat
dignity as a sacred value, never to be compromised. In fact, every one of us
voluntarily and repeatedly relinquishes dignity for other goods in life. Getting
out of a small car is undignified. Having sex is undignified. Doffing your belt
and spread-eagling to allow a security guard to slide a wand up your crotch
is undignified. Most pointedly, modern medicine is a gantlet of indignities.
Most readers of this article have undergone a pelvic or rectal examination,
and many have had the pleasure of a colonoscopy as well. We repeatedly vote
with our feet (and other body parts) that dignity is a trivial value, well worth
trading off for life, health, and safety.5
Pinker fails to notice that autonom y is also fungible. Soldiers give up some autonomy
w hen they enlist for m ilitary service. Employees give up autonom y w hen they sign
contracts agreeing to perform certain services and refrain from doing other activities
th at constitute a conflict o f interest. Police officers, FBI agents, and politicians
relinquish autonom y w hen they sw ear to enforce the laws o f our nation. Law yers
and psychologists give up autonom y in preserving confidentiality. By following
rules conducive to raising children, day care workers, parents o f young children, and
school teachers likewise dim inish their autonom y so as to better serve the young.
Patients give up all their autonom y— at least tem porarily— w hen agreeing to lose
consciousness during surgery. Do the actions o f these people reveal that autonom y
is a trivial value, well w orth trading o ff for money, public order, confidentiality, the
good o f raising children, or health?
Pinker offers a final rationale for ditching dignity:
Third, dignity can be harmful. In her comments on the Dignity volume,
Jean Bethke Elshtain rhetorically asked, “Has anything good ever come
from denying or constricting human dignity?” The answer is an emphatic

4Ibid, original emphasis.
5Ibid, original emphasis.
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“yes.” Every sashed and be-medaled despot reviewing his troops from a lofty
platform seeks to command respect through ostentatious displays of dignity.
Political and religious repressions are often rationalized as a defense of the
dignity of a state, leader, or creed: Just think of the Salman Rushdie fatwa,
the Danish cartoon riots, or the British schoolteacher in Sudan who faced
flogging and a lynch mob because her class named a teddy bear Moham
med. Indeed, totalitarianism is often the imposition of a leader’s conception
of dignity on a population, such as the identical uniforms in Maoist China or
the burqas of the Taliban.678910
Pinker fails to note that autonom y can also be harm ful to society and to individuals.
D esm ond H atchett exercised his sexual autonom y by fathering tw enty-one children
w ith eleven different w om en before the age o f thirty.7 Similarly, N adya Suleman,
unem ployed and unm arried, used in vitro fertilization to add eight m ore babies to her
other six young children at hom e.8 D rug abusers exercise their autonom y in harm ing
them selves physically and mentally, som etim es to the point where they becom e a
drain on society or are driven to steal or even kill to get their fix. Politicians regularly
exercise th eir autonom y in such a way as to cause unreasonable taxes, unfair laws,
and unjust w ars for their own political gain. Indeed, autonom y causes more harm ,
arguably m uch m ore harm , than dignity.
These tu quoque responses to Pinker are less than satisfactory insofar as real
questions can and should be raised about the role and im portance o f the concept
o f dignity in bioethics. Pinker highlights the am biguous ways in w hich the term
“d ignity” has been used in bioethics and thereby recognizes an im portant issue
th at deserves serious consideration, som ething that Pinker h im self fails to offer.9 It
likewise should be noted that “autonom y” itself is used in various ways and senses
(Lars 0 y stein Ursin, “Personal Autonom y and Inform ed Consent,” M edicine, Health
Care, a n d Philosophy, February 2009) so the difficulty o f am biguous use o f term s
is nothing unique to the term “dignity,” although adm ittedly “d ignity” seems even
m ore prone to am biguous usage than “autonomy.”
So how ought we to define dignity? Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., has distinguished
three ways in which the term is used in contem porary ethical discourse, namely,
as attributed dignity, intrinsic dignity, and inflorescent dignity.10A ttributed dignity

6Ibid, original emphasis.
7John Bingham, “Desmond Hatchett Fathers 21 Children by 11 Women before
Turning 30,” Telegraph.co.uk, May 29, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/northamerica/usa/5404674/Desmond-Hatchett-fathers-21-children-by-11-women-before
-turning-30.html.
8Laura T. Coffey, “As Octuplets Turn 1, the Real Work Is Just Starting,” Today,
January 26, 2010, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/34984163/ns/today-today_people/.
9For further critique of Pinker’s article, see Yuval Levin, “Indignity and Bioethics:
Steven Pinker Discovers the Human Dignity Cabal,” National Review Online, May 14, 2008,
http://article.nationalreview.com/357664/indignity -and-bioethics/yuval-levin.
10Daniel Sulmasy, “Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applica
tions,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 473.
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is the w orth hum an beings confer on others or on them selves. A ttributed dignity
com es in degrees and is at issue in the examples raised by Pinker. By intrinsic
dignity Sulm asy m eans
that worth or value that people have simply because they are human, not by
virtue of any social standing, ability to evoke admiration, or any particular set
of talents, skills, or powers. Intrinsic dignity is the value that human beings
have simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus we say that
racism is an offense against human dignity. Used this way, dignity designates
a value not conferred or created by human choices, individual or collective,
but is prior to human attribution. Kant’s notion of dignity is intrinsic.11
Inflorescent dignity, or dignity as flourishing, consists in the excellence o f a hum an
life consistent with, and expressive of, intrinsic dignity. Once these senses o f dignity
are distinguished, the concerns about am biguity expressed by P inker are resolved.
P inker also overlooks the fact that autonom y is not the same as, and cannot
itself serve to justify, the basic principle he proposes: “Because all hum ans have the
same m inim um capacity to suffer, prosper, reason, and choose, no hum an has the
right to im pinge on the life, body, or freedom o f another.” 112 I f he were consistent in
holding th at autonom y is the basis for our rights (rather than the capacity to suffer,
prosper, reason and choose, a characteristic o f tem porarily unconscious patients
who lack autonomy), rather than ju st excluding unborn hum an beings from protec
tion from losing life, bodily rights, o r freedom , he would then have to exclude the
severely m entally handicapped, the senile elderly, and new borns. The principle that
all hum an beings share the same basic m oral im m unity from these harm s is the same
in extension, i f not also in m eaning, as the principle that all hum an beings have a
shared, basic dignity.
The consequences ofjettisoning a strong conception o f hum an dignity include
endangering not ju st the classes o f hum an beings ju st m entioned, but even hum an
beings who are conscious but not fully engaged as rational agents. In his article
“M inim ally Conscious State and H um an Dignity,” Jukka Varelius suggests that “as
persons in m inim ally conscious state usually rem ain far from fulfilling the criteria o f
norm al agency, it would also not appear justifiable to grant them the same rights as
com petent agents have” (Neuroethics, A pril 2009). Read in the m ost benign light, the
view is unobjectionable, for a m inim ally conscious agent does not have the exact same
rights as a com petent agent in term s o f m any m atters, such as driving cars and entering
into contracts. But Varelius’s view seems to be that the m inim ally conscious hum an
being does not have the same basic rights as other hum an beings, but rather falls into
the same category o f so-called nonpersons as the hum an fetus and the patient who is
perm anently unconscious. Although his ultim ate conclusion in term s o f this m atter
are not obvious, it is clear that Varelius thinks that we are not justified in holding that
hum an beings in a m inim ally conscious state possess hum an dignity.

11Ibid.
12Pinker, “Stupidity of Dignity.”
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A fter noting the am biguity in the ways in w hich hum an dignity is used in
bioethical debates, for example, as a prem ise to argue both for and against physician
assisted suicide, Varelius takes up and critiques various argum ents that hum an beings
who are m inim ally conscious should be accorded hum an dignity.
Varelius raises the objection that hum an dignity is inherently unjust toward other
species. He says that “it could be m aintained that granting all and only m em bers o f
the hum an species special dignity is speciesism and, accordingly, m orally on a par
w ith such ism s as sexism and racism .” We should therefore reject granting dignity
to all hum an beings as inherently unfair to nonhum ans.
This often-repeated charge against hum an dignity rests on tw o confusions. The
first is m erely linguistic. From the truth that racism and sexism are wrong, we cannot
simply add “ism ” to some class o f characteristics to create a m orally illegitim ate
point o f demarcation. A fter all, advocates for anim al rights characteristically endorse
either sentientism (valuing sentient beings over non-sentient beings) or autonom ism
(valuing autonom ous beings over non-autonom ous beings). To simply assert that
denying dignity on the basis o f species is as m orally dubious as denying dignity on
the basis o f race or sex is to beg the question— which is precisely w hether nonhum an
anim als are equal in dignity to hum an beings.
Second, even if speciesism were ethically problem atic, a com m itm ent to the
dignity o f all hum an beings does not involve a denial o f dignity to any other class o f
nonhum an beings simply because they are not hum an. Those who defend the dignity
o f all hum an beings need not believe, and characteristically do not believe, that only
hum ans have dignity. A Catholic view, for example, holds that God the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit, as well as angels, are also persons w ith dignity. Even aside
from religious beliefs, it is possible that there are m any other beings in the universe,
such as intelligent aliens, that have dignity, for there very well m ay be m any other
beings in the universe who have a rational nature, and therefore have dignity even
i f they are nonhum an. O f course, such beings would not have hum an dignity, since
they are not hum an, but they would have dignity. The belief that all hum an beings
have dignity simply does not imply a com m itm ent to the view that only hum an beings
have dignity. In other words, the question o f anim al rights is simply not answ ered
by a com m itm ent to the equal, intrinsic dignity o f all hum an beings.13
In a different critique o f dignity, Varelius w rites, “It m ight be m aintained that
all hum an beings have rational nature by virtue o f having the genetic structure o f
a rational being. That could w ork in the case o f the hum an dignity o f otherw ise
norm al persons in m inim ally conscious state. However, the genetic constitution o f
some nonhum an beings, such as bonobos, can be m ore sim ilar to the typical genetic
structure o f hum ans, the paradigm rational beings, than is that o f genetically defected
hum ans.” By proposing another dilem m a, he goes on to argue that having the genetic

13
An example of denial of equal human dignity is found in Stephen Bates, “Prenates,
Postmorts, and Bell-Curve Dignity,” Hastings Center Report 38.4 (July-August 2008):
21-25.
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structure o f a rational being does not grant dignity. I f only m inor alterations in the
genetic structure are perm itted, then m any defective hum ans do not have it because
they have m ajor genetic defects. In this case, not all hum an beings have dignity.
B ut i f m ajor alterations in genetic structure are perm itted, then nonhum an anim als
would also have rational nature and so would have dignity. In this case, defenders
o f dignity would have to em brace a strong com m itm ent to anim als rights, which
they characteristically do not w ant to do (even though anim al rights are not logically
excluded by a com m itm ent to the dignity o f all hum an beings).
In his forthcom ing article in the Journal o f M oral Philosophy, titled “The Basis
o f H um an Status,” the prolific and insightful S. M atthew Liao has provided a basis
for an answ er to this argum ent by escaping the first horn o f the dilem m a. In this
article, Liao offers an im portant new way o fjustifying hum an dignity by m eans o f a
shared genetic basis for agency. This justification avoids the charge o f “speciesism ,”
since nonhum ans m ay have a genetic basis for agency. He also responds to critiques
o f the kind offered by Varelius:
The genetic defects that we are likely to encounter in these severely defective
human beings are not defects in the genetic basis for moral agency but at
best defects that undermine the development for moral agency. For example,
consider phenylketonuria (PKU), Tay-Sachs, Sandhoff disease and a whole
cluster of about 7,000 other kinds of genetic disorders, which are caused
by the mutation of a gene. The gene is typically necessary for producing a
certain protein or enzyme, which is then needed to change certain chemicals
to other chemicals or to carry substances from one place to another. Mental
retardation and other defects are typically caused by abnormal build-ups of
certain amino acids that become toxic to the brain and other tissues, because
the cell is unable to process these amino acids owing to the mutation. But
with treatment of a low enzyme diet as soon as possible in the neonatal age,
normal growth and cognitive development can be expected in many cases. For
our purpose, this shows that the brain tissue has initially developed normally
and would have continued to do so except for the abnormal build-up of the
amino acids. Therefore, following the distinction between genetic defects that
make up an attribute and genetic defects that undermine the development of
the attribute, single gene defects seem to be cases of the latter rather than the
former. Given this, one can say that human beings who have these kinds of
genetic defects most likely have the genetic basis for moral agency.14
I f Liao is correct, even hum an beings w ith severe genetic defects that underm ine the
developm ent o f a particular attribute w ould still have the genetic basis for rationality,
and this w ould also separate them from higher order prim ates. V arelius’s argum ent,
in other words, rests on m isunderstanding o f the nature o f genetic defects.
One more objection to hum an dignity raised by Varelius and echoed by various
neo-D arw inists is that, “in light o f evolution, it can be argued, there are no real
or im portant differences betw een such species as, for example, hum ans and great
apes.”

14S. Matthew Liao, “The Basis of Human Moral Status,” Journal o f Moral Philosophy
7.2 (April 2010): 167.
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Do we differentiate hum an beings and great apes on the basis o f differences
th at are not “real” but m erely figm ents o f our im agination? On the contrary, there
are objective, em pirically verifiable differences betw een the species in term s o f
appearance, behavior, reproductive possibilities, and genetic constitution. A re these
differences unim portant? One can adm it a shared origin o f all species and yet also
recognize th at from this shared origin, species have developed that are really and
substantially different. In some cases, the real and substantial difference is more
radical (bacteria and hum an beings) and in other cases less radical (great apes and
hum an beings), but in every case it is substantial. I f the hum an species is substan
tially different from others species, it is not unfair to treat them in ways that accord
w ith this difference.15
T hat hum an beings differ from all other species and that this difference is
ethically germ ane, are recognized even by some advocates o f neo-D arw inism .
Ben Dixon, for example, offers a “D arw in-approved argum ent for hum an dignity
[that] centers on the idea that hum ans are the only creatures capable o f creating,
m aintaining, and expanding institutions for m oral reasons.”16 He argues that this is
a difference in kind and not ju st in degree betw een hum an beings and nonhum an
anim als. In this, he does distance h im self from the historical D arw in who wrote,
“The difference in m ind betw een m an and higher anim als, great as it is, is certainly
one o f degree and not o f kind.” 17 Yet, i f Dixon is correct, then we have yet another
basis for hum an dignity, aside from the C hristian and K antian foundations already
w idely proposed and the genetic basis suggested in Liao’s article m entioned earlier.
Doubtless the dispute betw een advocates and deniers o f hum an dignity will continue,
yet the debate has been stim ulated considerably by these recent contributions.
C hristopher K aczor , P h .D.
Loyola M arym ount University
Los Angeles, C alifornia

15On this point, see also Christopher Knapp, “Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of
Principle,” Journal o f Applied Philosophy 26.2 (May 2009): 174-189.
16Ben Dixon, “Darwinism and Human Dignity,” Environmental Values 16.1 (Febru
ary 2007): 24.
17Quoted ibid, 38.
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